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Abstract
In this paper, we explore the fluctuations of unemployment and vacancies in the Italian
labour market over the last twenty years. For reasons of data availability on unfilled job
openings, this period is split in two parts. The former is covered by a help-wanted time
series, while the latter is analyzed relying on a harmonized vacancy rate. In both periods,
in line with previous findings on the unemployment volatility puzzle, we find that the
tightness indicator is more volatile than productivity. However, the gap between the
respective volatilities achieves the order of magnitude observed in other countries only by
using the official measure of vacancies. In addition, we show that a model with segmented
labour markets and on-the-job search has the potential to provide a rationale for the
pattern disclosed by the most recent data.
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1 Introduction
After the publication of two influential articles by Shimer (2004, 2005) - in which he shows
that the standard Mortensen-Diamond-Pissarides (MDP) model is unable to replicate observed
fluctuations in unemployment and job vacancies in response to productivity shocks of plausible
magnitude - the empirical appraisal of the cyclical behaviour of equilibrium unemployment
and vacancies has regained a lot of interest in the macroeconomic debate (e.g. Cardullo, 2010;
Guerrazzi, 2011).
Retrieving US quarterly data over a fifty-year time horizon, Shimer (2004, 2005) measures,
inter-alia, the autocorrelation and the volatility of unemployment, vacancies and labour pro-
ductivity. One of the most striking finding of his empirical explorations is that the standard
deviation of the vacancy-unemployment ratio, i.e., the labour market tightness indicator, is
almost 20 times as large as the standard deviation of labour productivity over the period under
examination. The so-called ‘Shimer puzzle’ (or ‘unemployment volatility puzzle’) comes from
the fact that the MDP model predicts that those two variables should have nearly the same
volatility.1
A number of contributors tried to address this theoretical inconsistency within the US econ-
omy. For instance, Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005a,b) rely on real wage stickiness questioning
the Nash bargaining hypothesis. Furthermore, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) show that cal-
ibrating the value of non-market activities close to labour productivity amplifies the volatility
of labour market tightness. Moreover, Pissarides (2009) suggests that taking into account that
mainly the wages of newly hired workers respond to productivity shocks brings the model close
to available evidence. In addition, Silva and Toledo (2009) and Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer
(2013) argue, respectively, that labour turnover costs and financial frictions may generate the
required amplification mechanism.
Spurred on by such a stream of theoretical efforts aimed at reconciling Shimer’s (2004, 2005)
empirical findings with the well-established theory of equilibrium unemployment, a number of
scholars become active in testing the soundness of the unemployment volatility puzzle even
outside the US economy. First, Zhang (2008) explores the cyclical behaviour of unemployment
and vacancies in Canada. Moreover, Miyamoto (2011) replicates the experiment with Japan
data. Furthermore, Gartner et al. (2012) do the same in Germany. While they provides different
theoretical rationales for observed paths, all those authors find that in all the countries taken
into consideration the volatility of labour market tightness is much higher than the one attached
to productivity.2
More recently, Justiniano and Michelacci (2011) as well as Amaral and Tasci (2012) test
1According to Shimer (2004, 2005), the intuition for those findings is that wages bargained according to the
Nash rule should absorb a great deal of productivity shocks. Therefore, vacancies and unemployment should
be only partially affected by erratic disturbances affecting the value of output.
2Specifically, the reported ratio between those indexes is about 18 for Canada, 13 in Japan and 50 in Germany.
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Shimer’s (2004, 2005) empirical results over a set of OECD countries in which a number of EU
members is included. However, until now, nothing has been said about the cyclical behaviour
of unemployment and vacancies in the Italian context. As a consequence, in this paper, we aim
at filling this gap by putting under scrutiny the macroeconomic fluctuations of unemployment,
vacancies and productivity in the Italian labour market over the last twenty years.
All over this period, the Italian labour force survey together with official national accounts
are able to provide homogeneous quarterly figures for both unemployment and labour produc-
tivity measured, respectively, as the fraction of the labour force actively searching for work and
the added value per worker.3 Unfortunately, the same does not hold for job vacancies and the
corresponding vacancy rate. Therefore, according to data availability on unfilled job openings,
our empirical analysis is split in two balanced sub-periods. Namely, the former (1993-2003) is
covered by the help-wanted time series (HWTS) provided by the Italian Institute for the Devel-
opment of Vocational Training (ISFOL), while the latter (2004-2014) is analyzed by means of
the harmonized, or official, vacancy rate worked out by the Italian National Institute of Statis-
tics (ISTAT).4 Retrieving data from both series, we explore the macroeconomic fluctuations of
the Italian labour market by keeping up the same computational approach adopted throughout
the literature mentioned above.
The main results achieved in this paper are the following. On the empirical ground, con-
firming previous findings on the unemployment volatility puzzle, we find that, in both periods,
despite some relevant heterogeneities in the co-movements of involved series, the labour market
tightness indicator is more volatile than labour productivity. However, the gap between the
two measures of volatility achieves the order of magnitude observed in other countries only by
using the official measure of vacancies. In addition, from a theoretical point of view, we show
that a matching framework with segmented labour markets and on-the-job search build along
the lines of Krause and Lubik (2006) has the potential to provide an amplification mechanism
that outperforms the baseline MDP model. In details, after the development of a two-sector
matching model in which firms differ in terms of the cost paid to keep open a vacancy, we
show that search effort spent by workers employed in bad jobs to look for better positions can
magnify the effects of productivity shocks on labour market tightness by delivering figures of
volatilities close to the most recent empirical evidence.
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 analyses the patterns of unemployment, va-
cancies and productivity in the Italian labour market over the last twenty years by exploiting
available data. Section 3 develops a matching model with segmented labour markets and on-
the-job search by exploring its amplification mechanism. Finally, section 4 concludes.
3Throughout the paper, labour productivity is measured as billions of euros of added value per workers.
4In the Italian context a measure of labour scarcity has sometimes been used as a proxy of the vacancy rate
(e.g. Sestito, 1991; Padoa-Schioppa, 1999; Destefanis and Fonseca, 2007). The cyclical behaviour of this index
is explored in Appendix.
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2 Italian labour market facts
In this section we provide an empirical analysis of the Italian labour market dynamics over the
period 1993-2014. However, as we stated above, this time-horizon is not covered by a unique
series for unfilled job openings. To the best of our knowledge, the longest and more reliable
Italian vacancy series available all over the period under examination are essentially two, i.e.,
the ISFOL HWTS that covers about the first decade and the harmonized ISTAT vacancy rate
that holds all over the second one.
As a consequence, in what follows, we provide distinct empirical analyses for the two relevant
sub-periods.5 Specifically, for each selected time-span, we take into consideration the level and
trend paths of unemployment, vacancies, labour market tightness and productivity. In addition,
a special attention is paid to the Beveridge curve, i.e., the well-known relationship between
unemployment and vacancies by testing different specifications. Moreover, for each series, we
report detailed statistics on volatility, persistence and correlation.
2.1 The period covered by the ISFOL HWTS (1993.q1-2003.q4)
The ISFOL HWTS is grounded on help-wanted job advertisements collected by the Center for
Business Statistics (Centro di Statistica Aziendale) headquartered in Florence. Data collection
started about thirty years ago. However, essentially for reasons of attrition, homogeneous
figures are available only for the years 1993-2003 (cf. Mandrone, 2012). All over this time-
horizon, the ISFOL HWTS retrieves information about job advertisements on the main 32
Italian newspapers.
The basic unit of survey of the ISFOL HWTS are job advertisements. However, the in-
formation collected in each newspaper is processed in order to derive an estimation for the
corresponding number of job vacancies posted by firms on a quarterly basis.6 Thereafter, fol-
lowing the official definition also implemented by ISTAT, the corresponding vacancy rate is
obtained by dividing unfilled positions by the total number of available jobs, i.e., vacancies plus
the total number of employed people.7
The level and trend paths of unemployment (u), vacancies (v), labour market tightness
(v/u) and labour productivity (a) all over the time-span taken into consideration by the ISFOL
5The two series for unfilled job openings do not overlap and this does not allow to implement consistent
merging procedures. Moreover, as argued by Valletta (2005), the use of an HWTS to retrieve vacancies beyond
the 90s will be rather misleading for the growing reliance of alternative sources such as internet posting.
6Since the collected help-wanted job advertisements usually target very generic or very specific profiles, the
corresponding vacancy index have been often used as an indicator for the most hunted professions (cf. Mandrone,
2012).
7The official ISTAT survey takes into account fixed-term and part-time jobs but it does not consider vacancies
for managerial positions. Obviously, the stock of employment is corrected in order to be consistent with these
restrictions.
4
HWTS are illustrated in the four panels of figure 1 (all the series are seasonally adjusted; HP
trends obtained by setting the smoothing parameter at 1, 600).
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Figure 1: Italian labour market facts (1993.q1-2003.q4)
The four diagrams show that the period covered by the ISFOL HWTS is characterized by a
recover of labour market tightness as well as a mildly upward trend in labour productivity. It
is quite likely that those encouraging patterns are the joint outcome of labour market reforms
aimed at increasing employment flexibility (namely, the Treu Act) and the end of austerity
policies carried out after the European monetary crisis burst at the beginning of the 90s.8
The level and trend log-deviation relationships between unemployment and vacancies are
illustrated in the two panels of figure 2 (both diagrams include the OLS estimation of the slope
of the involved relationship together with its standard error).
8An empirical assessment of the Treu Act grounded on an efficient matching frontier approach is provided
by Destefanis and Fonseca (2007).
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Figure 2: Unemployment versus vacancies (1993.q1-2003.q4)
The two diagrams reveals that the series of vacancies retrieved from the ISFOL HWTS
together with official unemployment rates are not consistent with the textbook negative shape
of the Beveridge curve; indeed, the relationship between unemployment and vacancies is sig-
nificantly upward-sloped both in levels and in trend log-deviations. According to the standard
DMP model, as far as levels are concerned, such an upward pattern could represent a conven-
tional job-creating condition identified by downward shifts of the Beveridge curve pushed by
the already mentioned labour market reforms carried out in the second half of the 90s that
probably increased the efficiency of matching. However, the adopted filtering procedure, is
unable to detect the negative shape of the Beveridge curve.9
A set of summary statistics concerning the trend log-deviation dynamics of the series de-
picted in figure 1 can be found in table 1.
ln (u) ln (v) ln (v/u) ln (a)
Standard deviation 0.032 0.006 0.027 0.009
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.642 0.640 0.632 0.816
ln (u) 1 0.764 −0.987 0.078
Correlation matrix ln (v) − 1 −0.655 0.419
ln (v/u) − − 1 0.009
ln (a) − − − 1
Table 1: Summary statistics, quarterly Italian data (1993.q1-2003.q4)
The figures in table 1 suggest some interesting but rather preliminary conclusions. First, as
we already said in commenting figure 2, there is a positive relationship between the trend log-
deviations of unemployment and vacancies that is inconsistent with the conventional wisdom
9Using the ISFOL HWTS, Sestito (1988) identifies a negative relationship between vacancies and unemploy-
ment by assuming that the the latter is driven by a linear trend.
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on the shape the Beveridge curve (cf. Shimer 2005). In addition, data reveal an unconventional
counter-cyclicality of labour productivity.10 Second, in contrast to the findings of Justiniano
and Michelacci (2011), the implied series of vacancy rates is less volatile than unemployment
and productivity. Moreover, the volatility of labour productivity is actually below the volatility
of labour tightness; nevertheless, the distance between the two is not that pronounced as we
observe in other European countries (cf. Amaral and Tasci, 2012).
Despite the short length of the time-horizon and the dynamic peculiarities of the ISFOL
HWTS, the latter result can be taken as a first signal that even in the Italian context a
standard MDP model might be not good enough to replicate observed data. Moreover, all the
issues related to the derivation of a vacancy index from newspaper advertisements without any
reference to shared official criteria are arguments for a further examination.11
2.2 The period covered by the ISTAT vacancy rate (2004.q1-2014.q4)
In the third quarter of 2003, ISTAT started a new survey on job vacancies and worked hours
identified with the acronym VELA. In compliance with the official EUROSTAT guidelines on
job vacancy reporting, this survey aims at measuring vacancies, job flows and worked hours
in firms that employ more than 10 employees.12 As a consequence, this survey provides a
harmonized vacancy rate that directly measures the extent of search externalities experienced
by Italian firms in their recruiting processes. After the ISFOL HWTS analyzed above, this
series is intended to become the longest data source on Italian unfilled job openings.
The paths of unemployment, vacancies, labour market tightness and labour productivity all
over the period covered by the ISTAT vacancy rate are illustrated in the four panels of figure 3
(all the series are seasonally adjusted; HP trends obtained by setting the smoothing parameter
at 1, 600).
10Amaral and Tasci (2012) observe similar patterns in Australia, Poland and Spain.
11For instance, Abrahm (1987) argues that occupation composition of employment, equal employment op-
portunity pressures as well as consolidation in newspaper markets may lead to substantial distortions in the
estimation of vacancies from job advertisements. Furthermore, in the Italian labour market additional in-
consistencies may derive from the fact that usually recruitment occur through informal links (e.g. Pistaferri,
1999).
12The sample size is about 15, 000 firms selected by drawing on the National Statistical Register of Active
Firms (ASIA).
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Figure 3: Italian labour market facts (2004.q1-2014.q4)
From a macroeconomic perspective, the time horizon described by the ISTAT vacancy
rate is quite different from the one illustrated in figure 1. As shown in the four panels of
figure 3, this period is characterized by quite adverse labour market conditions; indeed, after
the satisfying performance of the beginning, unemployment begun to grow at increasing rates
while labour market tightness displays a quite clean decreasing trend. In addition, the path of
labour productivity follows a typical double-deep pattern, indeed, after the dramatic recession
of 2008-2009, in 2012 the Italian economy experienced another period of decline after a brief
period of very feeble growth.
The level and trend log-deviation relationships between unemployment and vacancies are
illustrated in the two panels of figure 4 (both diagrams include the OLS estimation of the slope
of the involved relationship together with its standard error).
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Figure 4: Unemployment versus vacancies (2004.q1-2014.q4)
Even the picture of the relationships between unemployment and vacancies obtained by
means of the ISTAT harmonized vacancy rate is completely at odds with the one retrieved in
figure 3; indeed, in this case data clearly uncover the textbook negative shape of the Beveridge
curve.13 Those patterns suggest two broad considerations. First, taking the standard DMP
model, the level path of the unemployment-vacancy relationship can be interpreted as the
upshot of the identification of a conventional Beveridge curve induced by a job creating condition
that shifted in clockwise direction in response to the unsatisfactory productivity performance
emphasized in the last panel of figure 3. Moreover, on an econometric perspective, the trend
deviation paths of unemployment and vacancies reveals that the adopted filtering procedure is
actually able to detect the textbook shape of the Beveridge curve.
A set of summary statistics concerning the trend log-deviation dynamics of the series de-
picted in figure 3 can be found in table 2.
ln (u) ln (v) ln (v/u) ln (a)
Standard deviation 0.063 0.189 0.238 0.012
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.852 0.782 0.835 0.852
ln (u) 1 −0.710 −0.829 −0.615
Correlation matrix ln (v) − 1 0.982 0.807
ln (v/u) − − 1 0.804
ln (a) − − − 1
Table 2: Summary statistics, quarterly Italian data (2004.q1-2014.q4)
From the point of view of co-movements, the figures in table 2 are definitely more conven-
tional than the ones in table 1; indeed, all over the concerned period, vacancies and tightness are
13This result was already stressed by Baldi and Sorrentino (2010) on a pioneering study on the properties of
the harmonized Italian vacancy rate series.
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both pro-cyclical while unemployment displays the usual negative correlation with productiv-
ity.14 Moreover, in line with previous findings on the unemployment volatility puzzle reviewed
in the introduction, the figures in table 2 convey a clearer picture with respect to results shown
in table 1; indeed, the volatility of the official labour market tightness indicator exceeds the
one on productivity by an order of magnitude. In other words, the ratio between the latter and
the former is around 20, a figure fairly close to the one retrieved by Shimer (2005) and Zhang
(2008), respectively, in the US and in Canada. This result is robust to different smoothing
procedures.15
3 Towards a theoretical explanation of observed volatil-
ity
On the whole, data analyzed in section 2 do not provide robust cyclical regularities, especially
in terms of co-movements among the involved series; indeed, the only established finding is that
even in the Italian context the volatility of the labour market tightness indicator is higher than
the volatility of productivity no matter the data source under scrutiny.16 As a consequence,
in order to explain this dynamic pattern, we develop a theoretical framework able to generate
a suitable amplification mechanism. Specifically, we present an equilibrium version of the
matching framework put forward by Krause and Lubik (2006) and we show that labour market
segmentation and the possibility of on-the-job search have the potential to magnify vacancy
and unemployment fluctuations in response to productivity shocks.
3.1 Labour market segmentation and on-the-job search
Krause and Lubik (2006) develop a matching model in which consumption goods are produced
in two intermediate sectors which are assumed to differ in terms of vacancy posting costs. In
details, one of the two intermediate sectors is assumed to be characterized by higher costs
of vacancy posting with respect to the other. Therefore, as far as labour market conditions
are concerned, the former will be less tight than the latter. Moreover, for a decreasing return
argument, the former will be characterized by higher productivity and wages with respect to the
14An interesting additional feature conveyed by the figures in table 2 are the large increases observed in the
volatilities of unemployment and productivity with respect to their respective values reported in table 1. The
seriousness of the shocks that hit the Italian economy during the last decade is probably the responsible for this
pattern.
15For instance, setting the smoothing parameter of the HP filter to 105, i.e., the value adopted by Shimer
(2005), the ratio between the volatility of tightness and the corresponding measure for productivity switches to
a point value of about 21.
16As we show in the Appendix, this stylized fact also appears even when the vacancy rate is proxied by an
indicator of labour scarcity.
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latter by mirroring the traditional segmentation processes undergoing in actual labour markets
usually labeled with the distinction among primary and secondary sectors of the economy.17 In
turn, this segmentation of labour market conditions will lead workers (under)employed in the
low-wage, high-tightness sector to make some efforts to find jobs in the high-wage, low-tightness
sector in order to upgrade their positions.18 Calibrating and simulating this model, Krause and
Lubik (2006) show that their theoretical framework is able to fairly reproduce the observed path
of US vacancy and unemployment fluctuations in response to productivity shocks of plausible
magnitude.
In this paper we follow a different approach. Namely, we analytically solve a steady-state
version of Krause and Lubik (2006) model and then we assess the elasticities of labour market
tightness with respect to productivity under different scenarios. As shown by Shimer (2005) and
Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), such elasticities are useful approximations to the volatilities
of the corresponding variables in the dynamic stochastic set-up.19 Furthermore, we formally
and numerically show that search effort can effectively increase the response of the labour
market tightness indicator to productivity disturbances. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first attempt to evaluate the amplification mechanism implied by the framework of Krause
and Lubik (2006) by means of the derivation of the elasticity of the labour market tightness
indicator with respect to productivity.
3.2 The model
We assume that the economy is populated by a measure 1 of risk-neutral workers. Time is
continuous and the discount rate is denoted by r. In addition, there are two intermediate
good sectors in the economy, dubbed as g (good) and b (bad). The two intermediate goods
are combined together via a CES aggregator to produce the unique final consumption good.
Hence,
Y = a
(
Q
ρ−1
ρ
g + Q
ρ−1
ρ
b
) ρ
ρ−1
ρ > 1 (1)
where Y is the quantity of the consumption good, a is a measure of aggregate productivity, Qi
is output in sector i, with i = {g, b}, and ρ is the elasticity of substitution between the two
intermediate goods.
Product markets are perfectly competitive. As a consequence, taking the consumption good
as numeraire, cost minimization leads to the following inverse demand functions:
17Evidence of labour market segmentation in the Italian context is given by Cipollone (2001) and, more
recently, by Battisti (2013).
18The determinants of underemployment in Italy and other European countries are discussed by Ruiz-
Quintanilla and Claes (1996).
19Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) show that the two outcomes coincide in the limit when the arrival rate of
shocks is close to zero or changes in productivity are small.
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pi(Qi) = a
(
Qi
Y
)
−
1
ρ
i = {g, b} (2)
In each intermediate sector, each firm can hire one worker at most, that in turn produces
one unit of the intermediate good. Therefore, if ei is the level of employment in sector i, then
ei = Qi, with i = { g, b }.
The only difference between the two sectors is in the flow cost paid to keep a vacancy open,
namely, we assume that cg > cb. As it will be clear later on, the sector with higher vacancy
costs will exhibit lower employment and, for decreasing returns in the production function of
consumption goods, higher productivity and wages. Therefore, employed workers in sector b
exert some effort in searching for a job in sector g.
Defining u as the unemployment rate, the employment flows in the two sectors can be derived
in a quite standard manner. On the one hand, the flow of new matches in sector b is denoted
by m(vb, u) = µv
1−η
b u
η, with µ > 0 and 0 < η < 1, where vb is the vacancy rate in the bad
sector. Denoting θb ≡ vb/u, the corresponding job finding rate is given by f(θb) ≡ m(vb, u)/u
and the rate at which vacancies are filled is q(θb) ≡ m(vb, u)/vb, which is a positive, decreasing
and convex function of θb.
On the other hand, in sector g, the matching function is given by m(vg, u+seb) = µv
1−η
g (u+
seb)
η, where vg is the the vacancy rate in that sector while s is the amount of search effort spent
by the eb workers employed in sector b to look for a better position. If we define θg ≡ vg/(u+seb),
then we can again convey the job finding rate and the job filling rate as functions of tightness
only, i.e., f(θg) ≡ m(vg, u+ seb)/(u+ seb) and q(θg) ≡ m(vg, u+ seb)/vg. Furthermore, in both
sectors, at an exogenous rate δ, a firm-worker pair is destroyed in each instant.
Denoting by φ the share of employees in sector g, the prices of the intermediate goods can
be written as:
pg = a
(
1 +
(
1− φ
φ
) ρ−1
ρ
) 1
ρ−1
(3)
pb = a
(
1 +
(
φ
1− φ
) ρ−1
ρ
) 1
ρ−1
(4)
In steady-state, the flows in and out of employment status must be equal. Therefore,
δφe = sf(θg)(1− φ)e + f(θg)ug (5)
(1− φ)e (δ + sf(θg)) = f(θb)ub (6)
where e ≡ eb + eg = 1− u is total employment.
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The on-the-job mechanism implies there is a share of workers sf(θg)(1−φ)e that quit their
job in sector b to become employed in sector g. The discounted present value of employment
in sector g, i.e., Veg, verifies the following Bellman equation:
rVeg = wg + δ (Vug − Veg) (7)
where wg is the real wage in intermediate sector g and Vug represents the discounted expected
lifetime income of an unemployed worker in the same sector.
Similarly, the discounted present value in employment in sector b, i.e., Veb, is assumed to
verify
rVeb = max
s
wb − κs
σ + δ (Vug − Veb) + sf(θg) (Veg − Veb) σ > 1 (8)
Workers employed in sector b may exert some effort in searching for a job in sector g. The
disutility of on-the-job search is captured by the convex function κsσ. The first-order condition
(FOC) for the problem in (8) is given by
κσsσ−1 = f(θg) (Veg − Veb) (9)
Denoting the value for leisure by z, the values of searching for a job in the good and in the
bad sector, respectively, Vug and Vug, verify the following Bellman equations:
rVui = z + f(θi) (Vei − Vui) i = {g, b} (10)
Unemployed workers are free to direct their search towards either sector. However, a non-
arbitrage condition ensures that the value of searching for a job must be equal across sectors.
Hence,
rVug = rVub = rVu (11)
On the firms’ side, the expected discounted profits of a vacancy takes the following form:
rJvi = −ci + q(θi) ( Jei − Jvi ) i = {g, b} (12)
Moreover, the expected utilities of a filled vacancy in the two sectors are equal to
Jeg = pg − wg + δ ( Jvg − Jeg) (13)
Jeb = pb − wb + δ ( Jvb − Jeb) + sf(θg) ( Jeb − Jeb ) (14)
A firm-worker pair in sector b breaks down not only at the exogenous destruction rate δ
but also whenever the employee finds a job in sector g. In each sector, firms post vacancies as
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long as the discounted expected profits are non-negative, so that Jvi = 0, for i = {g, b}. Using
(12), (13), and (14) we derive
pb − wb
r + δ + sf(θg)
=
cb
q(θb)
(15)
pg − wg
r + δ
=
cg
q(θg)
(16)
The free-entry zero profit condition in sector g, i.e., eq. (16), is qualitatively identical to
the one retrieved in the standard MDP model and it equates the expected cost of filling a
vacancy (the RHS) with the expected revenues (the LHS). By contrast, in sector b, expected
revenues are discounted by a further term, i.e., sf(θg), that takes into account the probability
that workers may leave their job in order to switch in the other sector.
When a worker and a firm form a match, the surplus Vei − Vu + Jei with i = {g, b}, is
shared through Nash bargaining. If β denotes the bargaining power of the workers, then the
surplus-sharing condition can be written as
(1− β) (Vei − Vu ) = βJei i = {g, b} , 0 < β < 1 (17)
Consistently with Krause and Lubik (2006), we do not consider the option of recall. As
a consequence, this means that wages in previous jobs are not part of the outside options of
workers.20
Using eq.s (10)− (12) and (17) it is possible to derive that
θb cb = θg cg (18)
Since cg > cb, then θg < θb. Because of the higher vacancy cost, less firms enter sector g
leading to lower tightness, lower employment and a higher sector productivity implied by the
decreasing marginal returns characterizing the production function of final goods.
Exploiting eq.s (10), (12), and (17), the FOC for the search effort in eq. (9) can be written
as
s =
(
cb θbβ
κσ (1− β)
(
1−
(
cb
cg
)1−η)) 1σ−1
(19)
Furthermore, using the eq.s (7), (8), (10), (13), and (14), the Nash bargaining solution in
eq. (17) allows to write the wage equation in both sectors. Specifically,
wg = β ( pg + cgθg) + (1− β)z (20)
20Krause and Lubik (2006) extensively discuss the consequences of imposing a recall in the Nash bargaining
game.
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wb = β (pb + (1− s)cbθb ) + (1− β) ( z + ks
σ) (21)
It is worth noting that eq. (19) implies that dwb/d s = (1 − β)κσs
σ−1 − βcbθb < 0. This
inequality follows because the stronger the effort spent in searching for a job in sector g, the
lower the expected surplus of a match in sector b, as it breaks up more easily. Therefore, this
translates into a lower wage wb.
Definition 1 A steady-state equilibrium is defined by a vector (θi, wi, pi (qi)), with i = {g, b},
a value of search effort s, a share of employment in the g sector φ, and a value of consumption
output Y satisfying:
• The wage equations (20) and (21);
• The non-arbitrage condition in eq. (18);
• The FOC for the optimal search effort in eq. (19);
• The zero-profit conditions in eq.s (15) and (16);
• The FOCs in the final good sector in eq. (2) and eq. (1) for Y .
To find the steady-state equilibrium, we insert the expressions for the real wages in eq.s (20)
and (21) in the zero-profit conditions conveyed by eq.s (15) and (16) and then we substitute θg
for θb via the non-arbitrage condition in eq. (18). In this way, we derive
(1− β) (pb − z)− βcbθb −
cb (r + δ)
q(θb)
− (1− β)κsσ + cbθbs
(
β −
(
cb
cg
)1−η)
= 0 (22)
(1− β) ( pg − z )− βcbθb −
cg (r + δ)
q(θb)
(
cb
cg
)η
= 0 (23)
From eq. (19), recall that search effort s is a monotonically increasing function of θb. As a
consequence, the system in eq.s (22) and (23) is composed by two equations in two unknowns,
i.e., θb and φ.
21 If a (unique) solution of the system exists, then all the other remaining
variables of the model can be easily obtained by using the eq.s cited in definition 1. The
following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 1 If z < 1, then there is a unique solution for the system in eq.s (22) and (23).
Therefore, the steady-state equilibrium of the model exists and it is unique.
21Recall that, according to eq.s (3) and (4), pg and pb depend on φ only.
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The intuition for the statement in proposition 1 can be given as follows. The Cobb-Douglas
matching functions as well as the CES aggregator verify the Inada conditions. Thereafter,
taking into account that the latter displays decreasing marginal returns, it is easy to show that
eq. (22) is an increasing function in (φ, θb) space that intersects the horizontal axis in a point
greater than zero and that goes to +∞ as φ = 1. Moreover, eq. (23) is a decreasing function
in (φ, θb) space that intersects the vertical axis in a point between zero and one and that goes
to +∞ as φ = 0. As a consequence, a solution for system in eq.s (22) and (23) exists and it is
unique. Technical details can be found in Appendix.
3.3 Amplification of productivity shocks
We now compute the elasticity of tightness with respect to the productivity parameter a. Taking
into account the non-arbitrage condition in eq. (18), the elasticity of tightness in sector g has
the same magnitude of the one in sector b. In other words,
dθb
da
a
θb
=
dθg
da
a
θg
≡ ǫa (24)
Totally differentiating the system in eq.s (22) and (23) allows to derive the following ex-
pression:
ǫa =
pb
Φ0 +
cb(η(r+δ)+βf(θb)+Φ1)
(1−β)q(θb)
(25)
where the multipliers Φ0 and Φ1 are defined as
Φ0 ≡ −
∂ pb
∂ φ
∂ φ
∂ θb
θb =
φcb
(
βf(θb) + η(r + δ)
(
cb
cg
)η−1)
(1− φ) (1− β)q(θb)
(26)
Φ1 ≡ sf(θb)
((
cb
cg
)1−η (
1 +
1− β
σ − 1
)
− β
)
(27)
As convincingly argued by Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), the empirical counterpart of eq.
(25) is given by the following OLS regression coefficient:
ξ ≡ ̺ln( vu),ln(a)
standard deviation of ln
(
v
u
)
standard deviation of ln (a)
(28)
where ̺ln( vu),ln(a)
is the observed correlation between the tightness indicator and labour produc-
tivity.
According to the figures, respectively, in table 1 and in table 2, ξ takes a value of 0.027 in
the period covered by the ISFOL HWTS and a value of 15.946 in the period covered by the
ISTAT vacancy rate.
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Two terms distinguish ǫa from the corresponding expression of the elasticity in a standard
MDP model. The first term is the derivative in eq. (26), i.e., the term stemming from the
assumption that there is a decreasing demand for the intermediate goods produced by firms.
In the textbook MDP model, it is implicitly assumed that firms face an infinitely elastic demand
so that output price does not change. In addition, the second term is given by the expression
in eq. (27), i.e., the term that conveys the presence of on-the-job search in sector b.
The amplification potential of eq. (25) is conveyed by the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If
(
cb
cg
)1−η
< β(σ−1)
σ−β
, then ǫa is increasing in s.
The proof comes directly from the inspection of eq. (25). If (cb/cg)
1−η < β (σ − 1) / (σ − β) ,
then Φ1 < 0 and search effort has a positive impact on ǫa. In other words, proposition 2 claims
that the introduction of on-the-job search increases the elasticity of tightness in response to an
increase in productivity. Under plausible assumptions about the arrival rate of shocks in a and
the magnitude of its change, this implies that the introduction of on-the-job search amplifies
the volatility of tightness in response to shocks on productivity.
A rationale for this result goes as follows. When a positive productivity shock hits inter-
mediate sectors of the economy, firms post more vacancies both in the high-paid and in the
low-paid sector. Higher values of vg raises search effort s.
22 Thereafter, more job-seekers in
sector g imply a lower expected duration of vacancies q(θg)
−1, so even more vacancies are posted
in sector g. Vacancy creation and employees’ search effort are strategic complements. In other
words, an increase in vg triggers search effort that, in turn, raises vg even more. The process
ends because of the convexity assumption about the search cost in eq. (8). The final result is a
larger amplification in vacancy posting in response to a productivity shock. A complementarity
between sectors also arises. If search effort of low-paid employees goes up, then congestion effect
in the matching technology will make more difficult for unemployed workers to find a high-paid
job. As a consequence, they will direct their search toward the low-paid sector. This in turn
will boost vacancy creation in that sector.
3.4 A calibration experiment
The model developed above is quite non-linear. Therefore, in order to provide a quantitative
assessment of the theoretical results underlying proposition 2, we rely on a computational ex-
periment. Specifically, we calibrate the model on a quarterly basis and we evaluate how ǫa react
to search effort spent by workers employed in sector b to look for better positions.23 Moreover,
22Totally differentiating eqs. (18) and (19) leads to ds/dθg > 0.
23MATLABTM codes are available from the authors.
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for reasons of comparability with other countries in which there is a clean evidence of the un-
employment volatility puzzle, we take as reference period of calibration the last decade only,
i.e., the period covered by the ISTAT harmonized vacancy rate by targeting the corresponding
value of ξ. This choice is also motivated by the fact that the correlation matrix retrieved in
the period covered by the ISFOL HWTS is not consistent co-movements of variables implied
by the Krause and Lubik’s (2006) framework. Specifically, the model developed above does not
admit an upward sloped Beveridge curve neither a counter-cyclical productivity.
The model is calibrated as follows. First, consistently with Shimer (2005), the parameters
of the matching function and the job destruction rate, respectively, µ, η and δ, are retrieved
by computing job finding and separation rates exploiting OECD data on long-term unemploy-
ment.24 Moreover, in order to consider efficient fluctuations, we set β = η (cf. Hosios, 1990).
The value for productivity (a) is derived by averaging data in the forth panel of figure 3. Sim-
ilarly, the value of leisure (z) is obtained by averaging labour productivity all over the period
and taking into account OECD labour shares and replacement rates (cf. Martin, 1996). The
figure of the interest rate is consistent with an annual real interest rate slightly above 4%.
Parameter Description Value
µ Scale parameter of the matching function 1.548
η Elasticity of the matching function 0.519
δ Job separation rate 0.090
β Workers’ bargaining power 0.519
a Average productivity 0.014
z Value of leisure 0.005
r Interest rate 0.012
cb Bad job creation cost 0.200
cg Good job creation cost 0.800
κ Search cost function parameter 0.040
ρ Elasticity of substitution 2.450
Table 3: Calibration
The remaining model parameters are calibrated following the contribution by Krause and
Lubik (2006). Specifically, bad and good job creation costs, namely, cb and cg, are set in order
to mimic a 1 to 4 ratio while the cost function parameter (κ) is fixed at 4%. Furthermore,
consistently with the evidence provided by Falzoni et al. (2007), the value of the elasticity of
substitution among the two intermediate goods (ρ) is chosen in order to replicate an equilibrium
share of good jobs (φ) around 30%. Thereafter, the model is simulated for different values of
24Identification issues are addressed by instrumenting with lagged values of the involved variables.
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the search elasticity parameter (σ) in order to solicit different search effort levels (s).25 The
whole set of parameter values is collected in table 3 while simulation results are illustrated in
figure 5.
The diagram in figure 5 clearly corroborates the theoretical results of proposition 2; indeed,
there is a clear positive relation between search effort and the elasticity of the labour market
tightness indicator with respect to productivity shocks. Moreover, the simulated values of ǫa
have the same order of magnitude of the coefficient ξ computed by means of the official data
in table 2.
14.8
14.81
14.82
14.83
14.84
14.85
14.86
14.87
0.88 0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1
e
a
Search effort
Figure 5: Simulation results
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we explore the macroeconomic fluctuations of unemployment, vacancies and
productivity in the Italian labour market over the last twenty years. Since the selected time-
horizon is not covered by a unique time series for unfilled job openings, our empirical analysis
is divided in two parts. The former (1993-2003) is covered by the ISFOL HWTS, while the
latter (2004-2014) is analyzed relying on the harmonized ISTAT vacancy rate.
The main results achieved in this paper can be summarized as follows. First, on the empirical
ground, we find that in two periods under examination, despite some significant differences in
the co-movements of involved series, the volatility of the labour market tightness indicator is
higher than the volatility of labour productivity. However, the ratio between the the standard
25Given the values of η, β, cb and cg, σ is allowed to vary between 55 and 1, 000 in order to meet the
requirements of proposition 2.
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deviation between the two achieved the order of magnitude observed in other countries only in
the second decade when official data on job openings become available. This finding appears
quite robust and extends to Italy previous results on the unemployment volatility puzzle derived
in other OECD countries (cf. Shimer, 2005; Zhang 2008; Miyamoto, 2012; Gertner et al., 2012).
As a consequence, as long as the MDP model is used to design and evaluate labour market
policies in the Italian context it is necessary to take into account this stylized feature of the
business cycle. For instance, since productivity is less volatile than the tightness indicator and
wages are mainly determined by the former, a policy of labour market deregulation is likely to
be more effective in reducing unemployment than in affecting existing wage differentials.
Moreover, from a theoretical perspective, we show that a matching model with segmented
labour markets and on-the-job search build along the lines of Krause and Lubik (2006) has the
potential to provide the required amplification mechanism. Specifically, we show that search
effort spent by workers (under)employed in the secondary sector of the economy to look for
jobs in the primary sector can exacerbate the impact of productivity disturbances on labour
market tightness by delivering results close the official empirical evidence.
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Appendix 1: The ISAE indicator of labour scarcity (1992.q1-
2005.q1)
As we stated in the introduction, In Italy, before 2004, there was no official data on vacancies
and the only survey aimed at catching the unmatched recruiting efforts of firms was the one
grounded on help-wanted job advertisements carried out by ISFOL.
However, at the beginning of the 90s, a number of scholars (e.g. Sestito 1991; Padoa-
Schioppa 1991) retrieved estimations of the Beveridge curve by relying on a quarterly survey
carried out on Italian manufacturing firms by the Institute for Economic Studies and Analysis
(ISAE). This survey, among the other things, asked firms about their production restrictions
due to recruiting difficulties. Drawing on this information, Sestito (1991) builds an indicator
of labour scarcity that proxies the level of vacancies.26 Aggregating regional figures, the ISAE
survey allows to retrieve this additional measure of unfilled job openings over the period 1992-
2005.27
The level and trend paths of vacancies and labour market tightness implied by the ISAE
indicator of labour scarcity developed by Sestito (1991) are illustrated in figure A1 (all the series
are seasonally adjusted; HP trends obtained by setting the smoothing parameter at 1, 600).
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Figure A1: Vacancies and tightness implied by the ISAE indicator (1992.q1-2005.q1)
The LHS panel of figure A1 shows that the path level of vacancies implied by the ISAE
indicator of labour scarcity is completely at odds with respect to the one tracked by the ISFOL
HWTS. However, the path of labour market tightness on the RHS confirms the beneficial effects
on employment prospects carried out by the Treu act after 1997 already stressed in section 2.
26Specifically, this indicator is a non-linear monotonic transformation of the percentage of firms constrained
by the scarcity of labour. Additional details can be found in Sestito (1991) and, more recently, in Destefanis
and Fonseca (2007).
27The overall national reference is retrieved by weighing the regional figures with the corresponding employ-
ment level.
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A set of summary statistics concerning the implied trend log-deviation dynamics of unem-
ployment, vacancies, labour market tightness and productivity all over the period covered by
the ISAE indicator of labour scarcity can be found in table A1.
ln (u) ln (v) ln (v/u) ln (a)
Standard deviation 0.032 0.041 0.048 0.009
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.725 0.454 0.486 0.821
ln (u) 1 0.131 −0.544 0.083
Correlation matrix ln (v) − 1 0.759 −0.594
ln (v/u) − − 1 −0.558
ln (a) − − − 1
Table A1: Summary statistics, vacancies measured with the ISAE indicator
(1992.q1-2005.q1)
The figures in table A1 replicate the positive relationship between vacancies and unemploy-
ment as well as the counter-cyclicality of productivity already disclosed by the ISFOL HWTS
in table 1. Moreover, the vacancy and the tightness indicators display an unconventional corre-
lation with productivity. However, in terms of standard errors, the ISAE indicator corroborates
to some extent the empirical findings presented in section 2; indeed, even when labour scarcity
index is taken as a proxy of vacancies, the volatility of tightness is higher than the volatility of
productivity.
Appendix 2: Proof of proposition 1
Since for eq. (19) search effort s is a function of θb, eq.s (22) and (23) can be considered
as implicit functions of only two endogenous variables, i.e., φ and θb. We denote the former
ZPb(φ, θb) = 0 and the latter ZPg(φ, θb) = 0.
Consider first ZPg(φ, θb) = 0. It is easy to see that, as θb → 0, then pg → z and, for
eq. (3), this implies that φ tends to be a number strictly greater than zero. For the same
eq. (3), if θb → +∞, then φ → 0. Totally differentiating ZPg(φ, θb) = 0 and applying the
implicit function theorem, we also get d φ/d θb < 0. As a consequence, this expression describes
a decreasing relationship in the (φ, θb) space.
As far as ZPb(φ, θb) = 0 is concerned, if φ → 0, then for eq. (4), we have pb → 1. Under
the assumption of z < 1, this implies that θb must be a number strictly greater than zero.
Conversely, if φ → 1, then we have pb → +∞ and θb → +∞. Moreover, from eq. (19) we
derive
ds
dθb
=
s
θb (σ − 1)
(B1)
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The result in eq. (B1) leads to
dZPb
d θb
= −
ηcb (r + δ)
f (θb)
− βcb (1− s) −
scb (σ − β)
σ − 1
(
cb
cg
)1−η
< 0 (B2)
Using the implicit function theorem for ZPb(φ, θb) = 0, we have d φ/d θb > 0. This means
that this expression describes an increasing relationship in the (φ, θb) space. As figure B1 makes
clear, a unique equilibrium exists in φ and θb. In turn, the other endogenous components of
the model can be easily determined. Specifically, from eqs. (18)− (21) one respectively obtain
the equilibrium values of θg, s, wg and wb. Finally, the steady-state eq.s in (5) and (6) allow to
derive the levels of employment and unemployment in each sector.
Figure B1: Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
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